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Re: NYTimes.com Article: Op-Ed Columnist: The C.I.A.:



At 10:41 AM 2/3/2004, kvscanty@pacbell.net wrote:
I know this doesn't appear to be an anti-testing article but I think it sums up the problem perfectly...karen

It's quite entertaining, which what newspapers have been lately around here. If you want hard news, you have to go elsewhere.

Op-Ed Columnist: The C.I.A.: Method and Madness

February 3, 2004
By DAVID BROOKS





After speaking to "innumerable" U.S. intelligence officers,
David Kay has concluded that Bush administration officials
did not pressure analysts to exaggerate the threats posed
by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction....

No, they did not pressure them to exaggerate--they did all the exaggeration on their own.

...Leading the C.I.A.'s own internal review, Richard Kerr has
apparently also concluded that there is no evidence that
political pressures influenced the C.I.A. reports.

And this is precisely the problem.

I suppose, we should let the White House run the intelligence operations. Wait, they already do! Oh, yeah, that one's against you and me, not the external "enemies".

For decades, the U.S.
intelligence community has propagated the myth that it
possesses analytical methods that must be insulated
pristinely from the hurly-burly world of politics. The
C.I.A. has portrayed itself as, and been treated as, a sort
of National Weather Service of global affairs.

And it's been about as accurate. Actually, the NWS has improved leaps and bounds in the last five years. The CIA had the technology available a lot longer and their record is becoming worse.

It has relied on this aura of scientific objectivity for its
prestige, and to justify its large budgets, despite a
record studded with error.

There is nothing wrong with data analysis, as long as the people in charge understand that statistical predictions are not deterministic. This particular point is very closely related to the interests of this list--we are dealing with the same single-minded obsession to put all the eggs into one statistical basket.

The C.I.A.'s scientific pretensions were established early
on by Sherman Kent. In his 1949 book "Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy," Kent argued that
the truth is to be approached through a systematic method,
"much like the method of the physical sciences."

Again, there is nothing wrong with that, especially for the time when this was said. The difference is that the intelligence services are not dealing just with physical objects, but with human minds. Again, the parallel with educational issues is stunning. Human sciences cannot make deterministic predictions, period. One can offer trends, tendencies and distributions, suggest methods for improvement, but he should always be prepared that a substantial minority may buck the trend and that methods will fail to offer improvements for many. In education, ignoring this caution ruins lives. In the intelligence business, it ends them.

This was at a time, just after the war, when economists,
urban planners and social engineers believed that human
affairs could be understood scientifically, and that the
social sciences could come to resemble hard sciences like
physics.

I may see behaviorists behind every corner, but, in this case, they really were behind this trend.

If you read C.I.A. literature today, you can still see
scientism in full bloom. The tone is cold, formal,
depersonalized and laden with jargon.

To be more precise, this is not "scientism"--it is reductionism. And reductionism can be a very dangerous thing, especially in the hands of narrow minds, which, for the most part, what seems to prevail at the top of the food chain both in Washington and in the intelligence services. The real thinkers rarely make it to the top--they are too soft, they are prone to agonize over their decisions and that is not what is expected of "leaders".

You can sense how the
technocratic process has factored out all those insights
that may be the product of an individual's intuition and
imagination, and emphasized instead the sort of data that
can be processed by an organization.

See above.

This false scientism was bad enough during the cold war,
when the intelligence community failed to anticipate
seemingly nonrational events like the Iran-Iraq war or the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But it is terrible now in
the age of terror, because terror is largely nonrational.

Is this guy kidding? Having been IN the Soviet Union at the time of the Afghanistan invasion, it appeared to be a perfectly natural--and rational--outcome. The trouble with analysts here--Marshall Goldman is my favorite target for this purpose--is that they think they know more than they do. The fault lies precisely with the human element--even the most elaborate technologically and scientifically based prediction still require human interpretation and this is where the failures have been. Don't blame the technology for the incompetence of its operators.

What kind of scientific framework can explain the rage for
suicide bombings, now sweeping the Middle East?

It's called cultural psychology--something that has been rejected as a science by the reductionist hard-liners. Again, there is a parallel with education.

What technocratic mentality can really grasp the sadistic
monster who was pulled out of the spider hole a few weeks
ago? Under Saddam, Iraqi society seems to have been in a
state of advanced decomposition, with drastic consequences
for its W.M.D. program. How can corruption and madness be
understood by analysts in Langley, who have a tendency to
impose a false order on reality?

The same mentality that has ignored or supported Marcos, Bosota, Noriega (until he became insubordinate), Duarte, to name a few. Wait a second, they supported Saddam initially as well, did they not? Any scientist would notice a pattern here. The trouble is that we've asked non-scientists to interpret allegedly scientific data. And, ultimately, the decisions to ACT lie with politicians, not the CIA. Again, technocracy appears to be blamed for purely human failings.

We're in a heck of a bind. In the age of global terror and
W.M.D., we can't wait until threats are right on top of us.
And yet, given the errors over Iraqi W.M.D. stockpiles,
we're going to find it very difficult to act preventively
because we won't be able to have confidence in our
information.

We should not have had it to begin with! See above concerning determinism.

The people at the C.I.A. understand the problem: on the
C.I.A. Web site, you can find a book called "Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis," which details the community's blind
spots. But the C.I.A. can't correct itself by being a
better version of itself. The methodology is the problem.

Well, that may be the case, but the problem is not exactly where this guy thinks it is--you have to look in the right places even if your methodology is correct. We have not been doing that because the search is politically motivated even if the methods are not.

When it comes to understanding the world's thugs and
menaces, I'd trust the first 40 names in James Carville's
P.D.A. faster than I'd trust a conference-load of game
theorists or risk-assessment officers.

And you would fall into exactly the same trap. These are the guys who do not understand the meaning of the word "may" on an intelligence report. They always see an affirmation of whatever they expect politically. One cannot cull the data for information that matches his prejudices, then turn around and blame the source of the information for not offering alternatives.

I'd trust politicians, who, whatever their faults, have finely tuned
antennae for the flow of events. I'd trust Mafia bosses,
studio heads and anybody who has read a Dostoyevsky novel
during the past five years.

Somehow, the world was not better off with politicians running the show. WWI comes to mind--the conflict was not the fault of overanalyzing "technocracy". It really sounds like David Brooks is campaigning for a job.

Most of all, I'd trust individuals over organizations.
Individuals can use intuition, experience and a feel for
the landscape of reality. When you read an individual's
essay, you know you're reading one person's best guess, not
a falsely authoritative scientific finding.

That's funny and scare at the same time--trusting individuals over organizations CAN be a good thing, but, unchecked, it becomes anarchy. And, as I said earlier, ultimately the failings have been from human decisions, not necessarily from relying on "science" and "data" in organizations. But one does have to focus on individuals--that is, the decisions should be made individually. Hungary should not be analyzed the same way as Iraq even if trends appear similar (not that they do), nor should North Korea be seen in the same light as Iran or China or Cuba. It's all too easy to paint the world into "friends" and "enemies", but we are reaping the harvest from just this kind of policy that was allowed to dominate for forty years. The Wall might have fallen in Berlin, but it still stands in Washington.

So when the president names the members of intelligence
review commission,

Speaking of individuals whose decisions should not be trusted...

I hope he won't just select people who
are products of the old methodology. I hope he'll pick
people who will fundamentally rethink intelligence. And I
hope he'll throw in a few political hacks, just for a
little reality.

Can someone explain to me why all these people keep talking as if "the president" makes all the decisions, writes his own speeches or has any control over his cabinet? Are they stupid, blind or disingenuous?

"The President's" primary concern appears to be that all meetings start on time that his weekends not be interrupted by world affairs. I suppose, one could argue that they all mean "presidential advisors" when mentioning "the president". The trouble is, they are writing for an speaking to the masses, with many people actually believing what they read and hear, including that president actually makes his own decisions. Guys, we are not dealing with Richard Nixon here.

VS-)






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