Re: Fw: [care] from ASCD

[George Sheridan <learn@jps.net>]

ASCD's Infobrief on High Stakes Accountability Strategies, while presenting 
arguments for advocates as well as opponents, seems to me to make a pretty 
compelling case against high stakes testing and against its specific 
incarnation in ESEA. It even refers readers to FairTest and ARN. 
http://www.ascd.org/readingroom/infobrief/issue31.html This is in addition 
to the ASCD EDPolicy Update Monty posted at Thanksgiving time.

If the link does not work for you, try shortening it to 
http://www.ascd.org/readingroom.html. Then click on "Infobrief" at the left 
side of the page.

The page looks a lot better with its HTML formatting.

What Do We Know About Sanctions and Rewards?
By Heather Voke
Number 31
October 2002
High-Stakes Accountability Strategies

The belief that U.S. students have not kept pace academically with their 
peers in other countries and concern about the continued existence of an 
achievement gap between different groups of students in the U.S. have led 
education policymakers to adopt a variety of strategies to boost student 
achievement. One strategy, high-stakes accountability, has come to dominate 
the educational landscape. This approach involves rewarding or sanctioning 
students, teachers, and schools on the basis of changes in student test 
scores. Arguing that this dramatic approach is necessary to bring about 
long-overdue improvements in teaching and learning, advocates point to data 
showing that high-stakes strategies are effective in producing changes. 
However, some researchers, teachers, parents, and students argue that 
high-stakes strategies are detrimental to the educational process and 
exacerbate educational inequalities.

Twenty-seven states now rate schools primarily or solely on the basis of 
student test scores. Almost half of the states use test scores to determine 
whether students will be promoted to the next grade level or receive a high 
school diploma. Twenty states reward schools with money for high or 
improved test scores; in 15 states, the state has the authority to replace 
individual teachers or administrators, or to close, reconstitute, or take 
over schools deemed failing on the basis of test scores. Recent federal 
policy extends the use of the high-stakes accountability strategy to all 
states. No Child Left Behind, the most recent reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), requires that, beginning 
with the 2005?06 school year, all states administer annual tests in math 
and reading to all students in grades 3?8. Schools that fail to show 
sufficient improvement in student test scores will be subject to serious 
sanctions (see box on p. 3 for more details).

Given the widespread endorsement of high-stakes accountability, it is 
essential that educators, the public, and policymakers critically examine 
its underlying assumptions and arguments as well as the data on the effects 
that high-stakes accountability policies have on teaching and learning.

The Arguments and the Evidence

To support their position that a high-stakes strategy can be very effective 
in boosting student achievement and narrowing the achievement gap, 
advocates point to states that have adopted high-stakes strategies. Texas 
is one such state. There, increases in student test scores for both 
majority and minority students have been so dramatic that the phenomenon 
has been dubbed the Texas miracle. Lauded as an example of what is possible 
with high-stakes accountability, the Texas experience is cited as 
justification for extending this strategy from state to federal policy 
(Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000).

On the other hand, critics argue that increases in test scores in states 
like Texas are not sufficient reason to justify adoption of high-stakes 
policies. They assert that increases in test scores do not necessarily 
indicate improvement in educational practice, pointing out that behind 
these scores lies a complex story. They also assert that many of the 
assumptions made by high-stakes advocates are erroneous and that some data 
suggest that high-stakes policies actually hurt those they are most meant 
to help.

High-stakes accountability policies are only one element of a larger 
standards-based strategy to improve student achievement. This strategy 
involves clearly identifying the specific subject knowledge and skills that 
all students should be expected to learn at each grade level, specifying 
the level of performance students are expected to demonstrate, 
administering assessments aligned with the content standards, publicly 
reporting student and school performance, and targeting interventions to 
improve student and school performance (Elmore & Rothman, 1999). Advocates 
argue that this systemic alignment of all elements of the educational 
process provides the coherence and direction necessary to produce broad and 
sustained improvements in educational practice (O'Day & Smith, 1993).

Advocates of high-stakes policies argue further that some kind of lever is 
necessary to compel educators, administrators, and students to focus their 
efforts on achieving high standards; they contend that improvement will 
take place and that students and teachers will be motivated to achieve 
demanding standards only by the threat of punishment or promise of reward 
(Gandal, Rothman, Vranek, & Weedon, 2001). For example, Achieve, a national 
association of political and business leaders, asserts that "without 
consequences tied to test results, there would be little incentive for 
schools to deal with the current gaps in achievement" (Gandal et al., 2001, 
p. 5).

Chronically low-performing schools, particularly those serving children of 
color and children from low-income families, receive particular attention 
from high-stakes advocates. They argue that continuing to pour money into 
these school?when years of efforts to improve them have been fruitless?is 
ineffective because "the real problem in American education is the fact 
that too many students suffer from low expectations" (Gandal et al., 2001). 
Scheurich, Skrla, and Johnson (2000), commenting on the persistent 
achievement gap, reach a similar conclusion: "Many educators, not wanting 
to conclude that it is we who may have failed, have simply settled for not 
being successful with low-income children and children of color" (p. 294). 
Rewarding or sanctioning educators and schools based on student 
performance, high-stakes advocates believe, will force educators to raise 
their expectations for these children, and consequently narrow the 
achievement gap (Paige, 2001).

There is some evidence to support this claim. According to research by the 
Center for Policy Research in Education, "consequences help motivate 
[teachers] to work in more focused ways to produce improved student 
achievement" (Fuhrman, 1999, p. 6). The research of David, Humphrey, and 
Young (2001) produced the same conclusion: "High-stakes accountability does 
motivate educators to avoid sanctions" (p. 2). As Furhman (1999) explains, 
monetary rewards "are valued by teachers and can be motivating, and 
sanctions such as school reconstitution or identification as a school in 
decline are also valued (though negatively) and can function to motivate. 
Both get teachers' attention" (p. 7).

At the same time, researchers qualify these findings: Not all teachers are 
equally motivated by high stakes, and the way that teachers respond to 
high-stakes systems varies greatly depending on factors such as the nature 
of the stakes, the capacity of a particular school to change, and, most 
importantly, teachers' perceptions about the possibility of change.

Moreover, some researchers have found that while high-stakes policies may 
motivate some teachers to make changes in their practice, the types of 
changes that they make are not those intended by policymakers. Faced with 
the threat of sanctions and pressure from district and school 
administrators and the public, the immediate goal for some teachers becomes 
one of raising test scores. There is an understandable temptation to teach 
to the test. One recent poll of teachers found that 66 percent now 
concentrate on tested information at the expense of other important areas 
of learning, and 79 percent say that they have spent instructional time 
teaching test-taking skills such as pacing and filling in bubbles on 
multiple-choice questions (Doherty, 2001). David, Humphrey, and Young 
(2001) found that, given the pressure to teach to the test within 
high-stakes environments, it is only when the assessments themselves 
"encourage more ambitious teaching?for example, by asking for written 
arguments or applications of knowledge"?that teachers "attempt changes 
beyond practicing test-like multiple-choice items" (p. 2). Unfortunately, 
however, the vast majority of the tests used by states in their high-stakes 
accountability systems still "consist of multiple-choice items only or 
multiple-choice items supplemented with a few open-response items (e.g., 
essays). It is difficult for large-scale, multiple-choice tests to address 
important curriculum goals that require generative thinking, sustained 
effort over time, and effective collaboration" (WestEd, 2000, pp. 2?3). 
Skills such as critical thinking, problem solving, and working with others 
are better assessed by performance-based assessments.

Other researchers rebut the argument made by some high-stakes 
accountability advocates that improving student achievement is primarily a 
matter of forcing teachers to increase their expectations, not providing 
additional money or more equitable access to resources. After reviewing the 
research on the effect of school funding on education outcomes, Biddle and 
Berliner (2002) conclude that school funding does have a sizable effect on 
student achievement. According to their analysis across the 50 states, 
annual per pupil school funding ranges from less than $4,000 in some 
low-income communities to more than $15,000 in more affluent districts. 
These funding inequities leave many schools without the resources and 
capacity necessary to produce significant and sustained improvements.

Proponents of high-stakes accountability policies also assert that it is 
only fair that schools and teachers, like businesses and their employees, 
should be held accountable and rewarded or punished on the basis of 
performance. They argue that it is because businesses and their employees 
are evaluated in light of outcomes produced that they function efficiently 
and effectively, and that implementation of a performance-based 
accountability system in schools would likewise compel educators to focus 
their attention and resources on producing measurable improvements in 
student achievement.

However, opponents argue that public schools are essentially different 
types of organizations than businesses and that it is inappropriate?even, 
in some cases, potentially damaging?to apply business ways of thinking to 
educational contexts. Unlike the typical employee of a business, for 
example, teachers do not control the outcomes that result from their 
efforts, nor are students mere consumers of a product that is created by 
the teacher. "Teachers cannot predict the outcome of their endeavors 
because students, not they, are the primary architects of those outcomes" 
(O'Day, 1996, p. 3). Opponents argue further that a business-like focus on 
rewards and punishments undermines the nurturing and caring relationship 
between educators and students, a relationship that is the foundation of 
student growth and learning. They also argue that the moral obligation of 
the educator is different from that of a business employee; the educator 
has a moral responsibility to promote the overall growth of the student, a 
goal that may sometimes conflict with the goal of promoting gains in 
student test scores.

In the end, say the advocates of high-stakes approaches, the evidence is 
clear and straightforward: High-stakes accountability policies produce 
higher student achievement and narrow the achievement gap. And, according 
to researchers at WestEd (2000), it is true that "in many states, 
high-stakes testing has been accompanied by improved student performance" 
(p. 2). More than half of teachers, too, believe that curriculum has become 
more demanding as a result of the standards and accountability movement 
(Doherty, 2001).

Nevertheless, even here some disagree, citing evidence to suggest that 
improvements in achievement as reflected in test scores do not indicate 
genuine and transferable student understanding of content and skills. 
According to McNeil and Valenzuela's (2001) research in Texas, for example, 
the pressure to teach to the tests leads teachers to reduce subject matter 
to isolated collections of facts and meaningless exercises of skills whose 
sole purpose is to prepare students to answer questions correctly: "This 
treatment does not necessarily enable children to use these components in 
other contexts. For example, high school teachers report that although 
practice tests and classroom drills have raised the rate of passing for the 
reading section of the [test] at their school, many of their students are 
unable to use those same skills for actual reading" (p. 133). And although 
advocates of high-stakes accountability policies allege that such policies 
clearly have narrowed the achievement gap, others argue that high-stakes 
accountability systems have actually exacerbated the gap. According to the 
National Research Council, for example, "much of the existing research 
shows that the use of high-stakes tests is associated with higher dropout 
rates," perhaps because those who fail high-stakes tests experience an 
increased "sense of discouragement" (Heubert & Hauser, 1999, pp. 174?175).

Researchers have also found that the sanctions and rewards associated with 
the tests have led to disparities in both how and what children are taught. 
McNeil and Valenzuela have found that, in Texas, curriculum in nonwhite, 
poor communities has become fragmented and incoherent; higher-order 
thinking skills and problem-solving activities have been cut in favor of 
test-taking drills; and funding has been diverted from quality books and 
laboratory supplies to test preparation booklets, software, and other 
activities and supplies of limited instructional value beyond test 
preparation. Analyzing the effect of Texas' accountability system, McNeil 
and Valenzuela (2001) conclude that it "widens the gap between public 
education provided for poor and minority children and that of children in 
traditionally higher-scoring (that is, white and wealthier) schools" (p. 133).
Building a Better Accountability System

So what are educators and policymakers to do? Responding to research 
findings and their own beliefs about the detrimental impact of high-stakes 
accountability systems, some educators, parents, and students have publicly 
declared their opposition, joining forces with others to agitate for the 
abolition of sanctions and rewards in education (see box on p. 4).

Although many have publicly argued against high-stakes accountability, 
others have remained silent about their doubts. Some fear that their 
opposition to high-stakes accountability standards will be mischaracterized 
as opposition to high standards, equal opportunity for all children, or 
accountability in general. Such fears are not unfounded. Earlier this year 
when Governor Dean of Vermont expressed reservations about the high-stakes 
testing system associated with ESEA and whether it would serve students in 
his state well, U.S. Secretary of Education Rodney Paige (2002) accused him 
of throwing away "a lot of children's dreams" because he did not "want to 
make [his] public schools accountable to the public." Yet as Andy 
Hargreaves (2001), professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in 
Education, has argued, there is a difference between supporting the 
principle of high standards for all students and opposing the "particular 
programs of reform in which those principles are often embedded" (p. 47).

Differences in belief about which program of education reform to pursue are 
by no means new; indeed, such differences are endemic to the history of 
education in the United States. When they contribute to the healthy 
exchange of ideas, these differences can contribute to the improvement of 
educational practice. However, they sometimes muddy the water for educators 
and policymakers, obscuring the effect of a particular reform on education. 
Some argue that this is the case with the high-stakes accountability reforms.

Scheurich and Skrla (2001) note that "accountability has become a highly 
contentious battleground, with most voices either strongly for or strongly 
against it. Such polarization makes having a thoughtful, productive 
dialogue about both equity and accountability?a dialogue that actually 
yields a better understanding?very difficult today" (p. 322). They point to 
those who use "fragments of data, chosen from a vast array, in order to 
prove a point," and those who "cite only research that supports one view, 
even though good research that reaches different conclusions also exists" 
(p. 323).

Research leading to opposing conclusions and lack of data have led some to 
conclude that there currently does not exist sufficient grounding to 
justify an all-out implementation of high-stakes accountability strategies. 
Others counter that the consequences of not taking immediate action are so 
serious that the continued erosion of public faith in the public school 
system and the danger of leaving many of our nation's children behind leave 
us with no options: "States simply do not have the luxury of waiting to 
begin" (Council of Chief State School Officers, 1995, p. 14).

Still others, however, reject both of these ways of thinking, arguing that 
the threat of sanctions and rewards is not the only way or even the best 
way to improve education. Sirotnik (2002), for example, argues that not 
only do the assumptions underlying high-stakes accountability policies 
imply a "rather low estimation of teachers and students" but "there is 
evidence to suggest that good teaching and learning can be made to happen 
without having a high-stakes testing and accountability system in place" 
(p. 668). He points to Connecticut's 15-year effort to improve education 
through better paid and trained teachers, ongoing professional development, 
and continued attention to high-quality curriculum and assessments as proof 
that it is possible to improve educational outcomes without punishing 
students or teachers. Darling-Hammond (1996) also suggests an alternative 
approach, one that better aligns with what we know about motivational 
theory: We should create more personalized school environments where 
teachers and students come to know and care about each other's work by 
working together in small learning communities over a prolonged period.

Darling-Hammond and others believe that today's schools are outdated, that 
their very organizational structure undermines teaching and learning and 
forces us into a position of having no alternative but to rely on coercive 
structures such as sanctions and rewards. They believe that to bring about 
the needed changes, we must remake schools into places where students, 
teachers, and communities are accountable to one another, and where 
teachers and students have numerous opportunities to participate in 
meaningful and naturally engaging work. They point to the growing numbers 
of schools that have managed to combine top-down and bottom-up reform 
strategies to overcome serious obstacles and produce higher student 
achievement, better attendance rates, fewer student disciplinary problems, 
and a more engaged student and faculty body?all without resorting to 
high-stakes accountability policies. These reformers argue that such 
schools show us that it is possible to improve schooling and at the same 
time respect educators and children, to recognize that there is more to 
learning than the production of test scores, and to instill in all of our 
children the complex skills and understandings necessary to navigate a 
complex future.

ESEA's Accountability Provisions

High-stakes accountability is a core element of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Under ESEA, states must establish a single 
statewide accountability system that aligns with state content standards; 
beginning in 2005?06, they must administer tests in math and reading or 
language arts annually in grades 3?8 and once in high school to determine 
student proficiency relative to the standards. Science assessments must be 
developed and administered by the 2007?08 school year, and students must be 
assessed in science at least once during each of these grade spans: 3?5, 
6?9, and 10?12. The results of assessments must be publicly reported, and 
schools that fail to produce adequate improvements in student achievement 
will be subject to sanctions.

ESEA makes use of the high-stakes accountability strategy by requiring all 
schools to demonstrate that students have made adequate yearly progress 
toward mastering challenging subject matter as measured by performance on 
standardized tests. Each state must set student progress requirements to 
guarantee substantial and continuous improvement, and 100 percent of 
students must achieve proficiency in reading and mathematics no later than 
the 2013?14 school year. Test scores for students must be broken out and 
reported by economic background, race and ethnicity, English proficiency, 
and disability. Schools not demonstrating sufficient progress for students 
overall and for each subgroup will be subject to sanctions.

Schools that fail to demonstrate that their students are making adequate 
progress in reaching proficiency for two consecutive years will be 
identified as needing improvement. These schools must provide their 
students with public school choice and must pay to transport students who 
choose to transfer to higher-performing schools.

Schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress for three consecutive 
years must continue to provide their students with public school choice. 
Additionally, they must offer students from low-income families the 
opportunity to receive instruction from a supplemental services provider of 
their choice.

Schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress for four consecutive 
years will be subject to one or more corrective actions, including 
replacement of school staff, implementation of a new curriculum, 
appointment of an outside expert to advise the school, extension of the 
school day or year, or change in the school's internal organizational 
structure.

Schools that fail to make adequate progress for five consecutive years must 
be restructured through reopening as a charter school, replacement of most 
or all of the school staff, state takeover of school operations, or other 
major reorganization of school governance. These schools must also continue 
to provide their students with public school choice and supplemental services.

For more information about ESEA's yearly progress requirements and the 
sanctions applying to low-performing schools, see the following:

    *   U.S. Department of Education's No Child Left Behind Web site: 
http://www.NoChildLeftBehind.gov.
    *   Education Commission of the States. (2002, March). No state left 
behind: The challenges and opportunities of ESEA 2001. Washington, DC: Author.
    *   Learning First Alliance. (2002, January). Major changes to ESEA in 
the No Child Left Behind Act. Washington, DC: Author.


Resisting High-Stakes Strategies

Parents, teachers, students, and concerned community members in states 
across the U.S. have publicly expressed their opposition to high-stakes 
testing and accountability policies. In the spring of 2000, for example, 
students in 30 Massachusetts schools boycotted the Massachusetts 
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), either refusing to take the 
mandated test or deliberately scoring a zero. Joined by their teachers and 
parents, students also held a rally at the Massachusetts state house to 
protest the use of test scores in promotion or graduation decisions.

In Scarsdale, New York, 60 percent of the community's 8th graders boycotted 
the state tests in the spring of 2001, encouraged by their parents and 
local school officials. One parent stated, "Fundamentally, we feel the 
tests are not a good measure of what a child learns. Many students do not 
perform well on standardized tests. These kinds of tests reduce content, 
they reduce imagination, they limit complex curriculum, they add stress and 
cost money" (Hartocollis, 2001). The state education commissioner, Richard 
Mills, sharply rebuked school officials and ordered them to punish any 
future student test boycotts.

Parents have joined their children in boycotting high?stakes testing. In 
early 2001, 27 busloads of parents?part of a crowd of more than 1,500 
people-marched on the New York State capitol to protest what they believed 
to be excessive reliance on state tests to evaluate student learning and 
make promotion decisions. Similar protests by parents and students have 
been held in Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, California, and Florida.

Community, state, and national organizations now exist to help individuals 
share information and resources. In Massachusetts, parents and others 
formed a statewide network, the Massachusetts Coalition for Authentic 
Reform in Education (CARE), to oppose high-stakes testing and to ensure 
that all students have a fair chance to receive an excellent education. A 
coalition of more than 30 community-level chapters, CARE hosts an 
electronic discussion list; engages in outreach to media, legislators, and 
municipal officials; and holds public meetings and town forums. Students in 
Massachusetts developed a similar organization of their own, the Student 
Coalition for Alternatives to MCAS (SCAM). At the national level, the 
National Center for Fair and Open Testing (Fairtest) advocates against 
high-stakes testing through its Assessment Reform Network, and the 
organization's leaders have spoken out in opposition to the high-stakes 
accountability provisions mandated by ESEA.

Teachers, too, have spoken out against high-stakes accountability. The 
president of the Massachusetts Teacher Association (MTA) testified against 
the MCAS before the state board of education. At the annual meeting of the 
MTA, delegates voted in favor of a motion to eliminate the MCAS testing 
regimen altogether and to replace it with a system of multiple measures of 
achievement.

Opposition to high-stakes testing and the belief that it undermines the 
education process have led some teachers to leave the classroom altogether. 
As reported by The Washington Post, Bruce Snyder, a nominee for the Loudoun 
County, Virginia, teacher-of-the-year award, opted to leave the classroom, 
citing the state's emphasis on the mandated Standards of Learning (SOL) 
tests as his reason, despite his students' exceptional performance on the 
Advanced Placement tests. "It was SOL this, SOL that," he said. "It was not 
about 'How are you doing today?' or 'Let's learn something interesting or 
exciting.' It was just not a healthy environment."

In California, which financially rewards teachers and ranks schools on the 
basis of student scores on state-mandated tests, some educators refused 
their checks, donated them to organizations working against high-stakes 
tests, or contributed them to a scholarship fund for students at schools 
that didn't receive the rewards. Said one teacher, "High-stakes tests force 
us to teach in a way in which high scores become the most important goal. 
Teachers are forced to cram information into students but not to encourage 
critical thinking or broader knowledge. Testing really turns us into worse 
teachers." Another teacher added, "I tell my 4th graders that you have to 
stand up for what you believe in. How could I face them if I took this 
money?" (Bacon, 2002).

For more information and resources on groups and individuals opposing 
high-stakes testing, visit the Assessment Reform Network at Fairtest: 
http://www.fairtest.org


ASCD's Position on Accountability, High-Stakes Testing, and Low-Performing 
Schools

Using one test to measure success or to sanction students, schools, or 
districts is an inappropriate use of a single instrument. Only when 
students, educators, and policymakers have timely access to information 
from multiple assessments can they make informed judgments about student 
learning, student placement, and graduation eligibility.

Every student has the right to attend a high-performing school. School 
performance and resulting "high" or "low" designations must be determined 
by multiple indicators that extend beyond the use of tests. Identification 
and intervention strategies should focus on improving, not penalizing, 
schools. Interventions in low-performing schools should incorporate 
coherent strategies that include understanding each school's unique 
context, strengths, and needs; ongoing professional development for staff; 
research-based practices; parent, student, and community involvement; and 
the necessary financial resources to support transformation to 
high-performing status.

References

Bacon, D. (2002, Spring). Teachers reject testing 'bribes.' Rethinking 
Schools Online, 16(3). Retrieved September 3, 2002, from 
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/Archives/16_03/16_03.htm

Biddle, B., & Berliner, D. (2002, May). Unequal school funding in the 
United States. Educational Leadership, 59(8), 48?59.

Council of Chief State School Officers. (1995, Summer). Moving toward 
accountability for results: A look at ten states' efforts. Washington, DC: 
Author.

Darling-Hammond, L. (1996). Restructuring schools for high performance. In 
S. Fuhrman & J. O'Day (Eds.), Rewards and reform: Creating educational 
incentives that work. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

David, J., Humphrey, D., & Young, V. (2001, August). When theory hits 
reality: Standards-based reform in urban districts. Menlo Park, CA: SRI 
International.

Doherty, K. (2001, January 11). Poll: Teachers support standards?with 
hesitation. Education Week, 20(17), 20.

Elmore, R. F., & Rothman, R. (Eds.) (1999). Testing, teaching, and 
learning: A guide for states and school districts. Washington, DC: 
Committee on Title I Testing and Assessment, National Research Council.

Fuhrman, S. (1999, January). The new accountability. [Policy Brief 27]. 
Philadelpia: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.

Gandal, M., Rothman, R., Vranek, J., & Weedon, J. (2001, October). National 
education summit briefing book. Palisades, NY: Achieve, Inc.

Hargreaves, A. (2001). Beyond subjects and standards: A critical view of 
educational reform. Charting pathways to success in education in the new 
millenium. Ontario, Canada: Ontario Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development.

Hartocollis, A. (2001, October 31). No more test boycotts, Scarsdale is 
warned. The New York Times. Retrieved August 30, 2002, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/education/31SCAR.html

Heubert, J. P., & Hauser, R. M. (1999). High stakes: Testing for tracking, 
promotion, and graduation. Washington, DC: Committee on Appropriate Test 
Use, Board on Testing and Assessment, National Research Council.

Kelley, C., Odden, A., Milanowski, A., & Heneman, H. (2000, February). The 
motivational effects of school-based performance awards. [Policy Brief 29]. 
Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.

Klein, S. P., Hamilton, L. S., McCaffrey, D. F., & Stecher, B. M. (2000). 
What do test scores in Texas tell us? Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Retrieved 
September 3, 2002, from http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP202

McNeil, L., & Valenzuela, A. (2001). The harmful impact of the TAAS system 
of testing in Texas. In G. Orfield & M. L. Kornhaber (Eds.), Raising 
standards or raising barriers? Inequality and high-stakes testing in public 
education. New York: Century.

O'Day, J. A., & Smith, M. S. (1993). Systemic reform and educational 
opportunity. In S. Fuhrman (Ed.), Designing coherent education policy. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

O'Day, S. (Ed.). (1996). Incentives and school improvement. In Rewards and 
reform: Creating educational incentives that work. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Paige, R. (2001, March 7). Testimony on No Child Left Behind before the 
House Committee on Education and the Workforce. Retrieved September 3, 
2002, from http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/03-2001/010307.html

Paige, R. (2002, April 27). Remarks at the Education Writers Association 
Seminar 2002, Washington, DC.

Scheurich, J. J., & Skrla, L. (2001, December). Continuing the conversation 
on equity and accountability: Listening appreciatively, responding 
responsibly. Phi Delta Kappan, 84(4), 322?326.

Scheurich, J. J., Skrla, L., & Johnson, J. F. (2000, April). Thinking 
carefully about equity and accountability. Phi Delta Kappan, 81(8), 293?299.

Sirotnik, K. (2002, May). Promoting responsible accountability in schools 
and education. Phi Delta Kappan, 83(9), 662?673.

WestEd. (2000, February). The high stakes of high-stakes testing. Palo 
Alto, CA: Author.

Copyright © 2002 by Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development


At 10:05 AM 11/27/2002 -0500, Monty Neill wrote:
> e5ceac1.gif e5ceacc.gif ASCD EDPolicy Update
> The latest issue of ASCD EDPolicy Update is now available online. It 
> focuses on testing issues and the rising backlash evidenced by some 
> politicians rejecting the use or expansion of high stakes programs; the 
> tendency of policymakers and the general public to confuse "high stakes" 
> with "high standards"; and other policy-related news and resources. 
> <http://rdr.sbml.cc/Click?q=00-4F6lI9Qsp2arLHrbO4RCxPSE>EDPolicy Update


George Sheridan
Northside School
Cool, California 95614